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CASES NOTED
and constables to accept bail bond,25 it makes no mention of police officers,
and there is no provisions for taking cash substitutes. Since embezzlement
is a statutory offens& requiring that a definite legal relation exist between
the embezzler and the embezzled, 2 7 the finding that the accused was a
trustee for the depositor rather than for the municipality furnished a
legally sufficient rationale for the majority opinion. The dissent reasoned
that the absence of any specific inhibition in the Code against the ac-
ceptance of a substitute for bail bond, together with the long period of
ratification of the defendant's acts gave such color of authority to the
chief of police as would warrant finding the necessary relation to sustain
the conviction for embezzlement. 28
It is submitted that such strict adherence to the letter of the statute
prevented the merited punishment of a public official for an intended
criminal act which, under the agency rationale of the minority, was pun-
ishable. There being no judicial remedy left under the decision, it appears
highly desirable for the Georgia General Assembly to correct this anomalous
situation by appropriate legislation.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONTRIBUTION OF JOINT TORT-
FEASORS RESIDENTS OF DIFFERENT STATES
Plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, and defendant, a Pennsylvania resident,
as joint tort-feasors caused an accident in Ohio. Plaintiff paid an Ohio
judgment to an injured third party and sought indemnity or contribution
from the defendant in a Pennsylvania action. The Court of Common
Pleas granted full indemnity. Held, that indemnity cannot be granted where
plaintiff is a joint tort-feasor and that application of the Ohio law, which is
contra to Pennsylvania statute, precludes relief by way of contribution.
Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951).
The law with respect to indemnity and contribution is basically clear.
While indemnity is a right to full reimbursement' which springs from a
contract, 2 contribution is an apportionment of damages, " a right arising out
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-902 (1933).
26. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2801 (1933); Hughes v. United States, 4 F.2d 686 (Sth
Cir. 1925); Fitch v. State, 135 Fla. 361, 185 So. 435 (1938).
27. People v. Hayes, 365 111. 318, 6 N.E.2d 645 (1937).
28. Scarboro v. State, 62 S.E.2d 168, 169 (Ga. 1950) (dissenting opinion by Atkin-
son, Presiding Justice).
1. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 227, 199
At. 93 (1938); Mo. Dist. Tel. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 338 Mo. 692, 93
S.W.2d 19 (1935); Lasher v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 App, Div. 564, 3 N. Y. S.
2d 32 (1938).
2. George's Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
Shannon v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 62 F. Supp. 532 (D. C. La. 1945); Vandiver v.
Pollak, 107 Ala. 547, 19 So. 180 (1895); Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 725, 212 S.W.2d 935
(1948).
3. St. Lewis v. Morrison, 50 F. Supp. 570 (D. C. Ky. 1943); 'In re Lohr's Estate,
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of equity.' It is well recognized that one joint tort-feasor cannot maintain
an action for indemnity against another6 but may, where a statute exists
authorizing it, have contribution."
It has been said that "conflict of laws problems have a beguiling ten-
dency to be made even more complicated than they are ..... " This is evi-
dent when an accepted dichotomy of laws, the familiar procedural-substan-
tive one,8 must be considered. The line between substance and procedure is
not only hazy," it is movable' as well. Upon the court of the forum rests
the burden of discovering this line." Once this line is discovered the courts
follow the rule that the substantive law of the lex loci is to be applied 12 with
the procedural law of the forum.' While the difference between substance
and procedure is incapable of exact definition,' 4 suffice it to say that sub-
stance is that law from which the right of action arises' 5 while procedure is
that law which governs the enforcement of these rights.16
After extensively examining the law with respect to indenity and con-
tribution, the court, in the instant case, followed the legion of cases holding
that there is no right to indemnity in joint tort-feasor situations.' 7 When
132 Pa. Super. 125, 200 At. 135 (1938); Wedel v. Klein, 229 Wis. 419, 282 N. W.
606 (1938); Farrelly, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tort-Feasors in Louisi-
ana, 5 LoroLA L. REv. 151 (1949).
4. Shannon v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., supra note 2; Ocean Accident & Gtuaran-
tee Corp. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 63 Ariz. 352, 162 P.2d 609 (1945); Brown
v. Brown, 58 Ariz. 333, 119 P.2d 938 (1941); Jackson v. Lacy, 37 Cal. App.2d 685, 100
P.2d 313 (1940); Daniel v. Best, 532 Iowa 785, 5 N.W.2d 149 (1942).
5. Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 196 U. S. 217
(1905); Ain. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Mack, 34 F. Supp. 224 (D. C. Ky. 1940); City of
Louisville v. Louisville Ry., 156 Ky. 141, 160 S. W. 771 (1913); Mass. Bonding &
Ins. Co. v. Dingle-Clark Co., 142 Ohio St. 346, 353, 354, 52 N. E.2d 340, 343, 344
(1943); Northern Ohio Ry. v. Akron Canal & Hydraulic Co., 18 Ohio 51, aff'd with-
out opinion, 75 Ohio St. 620, 80 N. E. 1130 (1906).
6. Cent. Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Miss. Export Ry., 91 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1937);
Malkin v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948 (D. C. Mdo. 1941); Larson v. Cleveland Ry.,
142 Ohio St. 20, 50 N E.2d 163 (1943).
7. See Vanston Committee v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, 169 (1946) (opinion by Jus-tice Frankfurter).8. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 559 (1949) (opinion
by Justice Rutledge).
9. See Sampson v. Chanell, 110 F.2d 754, 756 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310
U. S. 650, 652 (1940).
10. See Cook, Characterization in the Conflicts of Laws, 51 YALE L. J. 191 (1941);
Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflicts of Laws, 42 YALE L. J., 333 (1932).
11. See note 10 supra.
12. See Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24
N.W.2d 836 (1946); note 10 supra; RESTATrMENT, COrNFLICT OF LAWS § 584 (1939);
Characterization of Multi-State Libel in Conflict of Laws, 48 COL. L. REv. 932 (1948).
13. See McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in Conflict of Laws, 78
U. OF PA. L. REV. 933 (1930).
14. In re Paine's Estate, 128 Fla. 151, 174 So. 430 (1930).
15. See Dexter v. Edmnands, 89 Fed. 467, 468 (C. C. Mass. 1898).
16. See Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 264, 14 P.2d 1087, 1091 (1932); Mix v.
Board of Comm'rs of Nez Perce County, 18 Idaho 695, 700, 112 Pac. 215, 220 (1910);
State v. McConnell, 156 Tenn. 523, 324, 3 S.W.2d 161, 162 (1928); Maurizi v. Western
Coal and Mining Co., 321 Mo. 378, 381, 11 S.W.2d 268, 272 (1928).
17. Ibid. See also State v. Ehnore, 179 La. 1057, 155 So. 896 (1934); State
v. Rodosta, 173 Ld. 623, 625, 138 So. 124, 126 (1931).
CASES NOTED
faced with the contribution question where a Pennsylvania statute allows
contribution to be enforced' and Ohio law denies it, the court had to make
a choice of laws. Of necessity the court looked to the Ohio law'" to dis-
cover whether it was substantive or procedural in this particular case. By
using the rationale that there was an "implied engagement of each to bear
the common burden" the court held the right of contribution to be "quasi-
contractual". After finding that the contract law which gives rise to the
right of contribution is substantive, the court applied it in conformity with
conflict rules.
20
Vith the law clear on the contribution aspect of this case the only
arguable portion of the opinion is found in the court's holding the Ohio
law to be substantive. It appears that the court considered contribution to
be a right and since basic classification rules hold that the law of substance
is that law which creates a right, it concluded that the Ohio law denying
contribution was substantive. Contrary to this, the Pennsylvania statute
procedurally allows enforcement of this equitable right. Would it not have
been as correct to look to the Ohio law and discover that Ohio law does not
allow enforcement of the equitable right of contribution? With this find-
ing the court could then have held the Ohio law to be procedural and could
have applied the Pennsylvania statute, thereby preventing this apparently
inequitable result.
CRIMINAL LAW - CONVICTION FOR VAGRANCY UNDER
CALIFORNIA STATUTE
The defendant was charged with two offenses defined in separate para-
graphs of one vagrancy statute.' These offenses took place almost a month
apart and he was given two sentences to run consecutively. Held, on appeal,
only one sentence can be imposed for the commission of any or all of the
offenses set out in the one statute. People v. Ailington, 229 P. 2d 495 (Cal.
App. 1951).
18. PA. STATS. tit. 12, § 2081 (1939); Kelly v. Pa. R.R., 7 FRl) 524 (D. C.
Pa. 1948); Union Paving Co. v. Thomas, 9 F. R. 1). 612 (I). C. Pa. 1950); Anstine v.
Pa. R. R., 352 Pa. 43 A.2d 109 (1945).
19. See note 12 supra.
20. See notes 13 and 14 supra.
1 CAL. PEN. ConE § 647 (1949).
"l. Every person without visible means of living . . .; or
2. Every beggar who solicits alms as a business; or
3. Every person who roams from place to place without any lawful business; or
4. Every person known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar, or confidence operator
... having no visible means of support . . .; or
5. Every idle, or lewd, or dissolute person, or associate of known thieves; or
6. Every person who wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of the
night, without any visible or lawful business; or
7. Every person who lodges in any barn . . . or place other than such as is kept for
lodging purposes, without the permission of the owner . . .; or
